British Army Command & Doctrine
I was prompted by a plaque in the Tank Museum to consider if the Army was always looking back to the last war. It certainly seems to have done poorly in both Iraq & Afghanistan. In fact, once the British were known for winning their wars, but the hostory over the last 40 years is not so good. Looking on Google, about the Army’s institutional memory took me to “Losing the new great game” which discusses, quite critically the management of the military campaigns mainly in Afghanistan. It certainly reinforced some conclusions I had come too and the written paper, is very well referenced for those who want more.
Losing the new great game by Frank Ledwidge
I read the article, in “Games: Conflict, Competition and Collaboration” which as I say, has numerous cited quotes.
- Top-heavy British Army halves number of generals from the Times (£)
- Do we really want a politically correct British Army? another from the Times, and it needs to be read with a view that its from the Times; not all wrong though. It refers to “Values & Standards”, an Army document. But, civilian law, is more than Equalities Act, in 2020, as a postscript to Iraq, the Govt. wrote exemptions to Human Rights law for the operational military and the book is not closed on even events in Northern Ireland from the 1970’s. Written by General Lord Dannet in 2016 also pushing his book, “Boots on the Ground”.
The issue of the role of law in war is complex yet has been growing and the US and European approaches have been diverging.
If you put the blog article title into google, you get some interesting replies, especially from the Army or MoD. Maybe worth looking at.
There”s something about Cameron’s defence review, which was savage, and the ‘military covenant‘ somewhere in here. Ledwidge keeps clear of the issues of manpower and helicopters, of which, most seem to agree there weren’t enough.